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This paper is about agricultural value chain and aims at evaluating the impact of Producer 
Organizations (POs) on a vegetable value chain. In particular, the objective of this study is to 
compare added value distribution among players in the vegetable sectors in different supply 
chain scenarios, i.e. supply chain with a PO as intermediary and supply chain with a 
wholesaler as intermediary. We will focus on an empirical application of ISMEA value chain to 
the supply chain of two vegetables: the “Radicchio rosso di Treviso tardivo IGP” and its 
equivalent not certified product, the “spadone” chicory, which are both produced in the 
Veneto region only. The case study evidence suggests that POs allow farmers to reach a 
greater benefit, compared to ordinary supply chain, even if such efficiencies could have been 
higher. Since the substantial review and reduction of direct support to agricultural income, 
the tools improving supply concentration appear as the few tools, which can enable a return 









The organization of agrifood supply chain is a sensitive issue and its optimization can 
improve the profitability of agricultural activities. One of the objectives of many scholars and 
politicians is to identify tools and organizational models, which reduce the scattering of 
producers and coordinate the different players in supply chain, to ensure a fairer and more 
effective income distribution. 
Typically, farmers are competitors, but, at the same time, they often suffer the buyer power 
exerted by wholesalers, traders, and distributors. In addition, as shown by some studies 
(Zaghi and Bono, 2011; Nomisma, 2009; AGCM, 2007; Pezzoli, 2011) agricultural supply 
chains suffer from system inefficiencies. 
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In order to improve the competitive position of farmers increasing their margins, it is 
fundamental to assess concentration and qualification of the supply. Both these issues are 
important, given the growing demand for quality and services by consumers (Frascarelli, 
2008; Giacomini, 2013). 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in fruit and vegetable (F&V) sector identifies Producer 
Organizations (POs) as responsible for planning, focusing and qualifying supply in order to 
adapt it to the demand. Therefore POs should facilitate the improvement of the bargaining 
position of producers (EC 1182/2007; EC 1234/2007; EC 2200/1996; EEC 23/1962). 
Despite some evaluations focused on positive results achieved by POs (Agrosynergie, 2008; 
ISMEA and MIPAAF, 2012; Camanzi et al., 2009), in literature there is a lack in the real 
impact in terms of rationalization, efficiency and equity in the distribution of value added 
along the supply chain (European Commission, 2014). 
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to assess whether the presence of POs in 
the F&V industry improves equity and efficiency in the distribution of value added among the 
players, in particular for farmers. 
From this general objective two research questions arise: 
1. Do POs transfer any benefit to their members? 
2. Does product differentiation, such as organic or Geographical Indications (GIs), have 
some effects on margins distribution along the supply chain, with a real benefit for farmers? 
This is a particularly relevant theme given the increasing centrality of coordination between 
the different stages of the supply chain in recent years.  
Over more than fifty years, CAP main objectives established in the Treaties have remained 
unchanged. However, the tools to achieve those objectives have changed: policy makers 
started from direct intervention and then gradually moved to reorient agriculture to the 
market. Especially by the last Reform in 2013, CAP moved toward a decentralized 
management of the Common Market Organization (CMO), delegating POs and interbranch 
organizations (IBO) the policy negotiation and implementation activities (Frascarelli, 2012a; 
2012b; 2012c; Canali, 2013; 2007).  
POs system in F&V sector is considered a model for the other sectors. One of the most 
important key elements of CAP 2014-2020 refers to a significant modification in the 
application of competition rules in the agricultural sector (European Commission COM, 2014). 
According to the new CMO, in the olive oil, beef and veal, and arable crops sectors POs will 
assume a central role in the negotiation of the contract terms (including pricing) for the sale 
of some or all of their production, notwithstanding the application of competition rules. In 
order to gain benefits from this derogation, the efficiencies created by POs should overtake 
the possible negative effects of joint selling1. 
Therefore, in order to provide policy makers with new evidences to incentive POs 
development, it is worth investigating the impact of POs on agriculture system, focusing on 
their ability to increase efficiency in the use of public resources.  
                                                          
1  In this way, the efficiencies assessed should guarantee the activities of POs contribute to the 
fulfillment of the objectives of the CAP set out in Article 39 of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union. New regulations aim to give some exceptions to the competition rules, in accordance 
with Articles 169, 170 and 171 of the CMO regulation (EU Reg. n. 1308/2013). 
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Unlike the fruit sector, in the vegetable sector supply chain historically suffers from a high 
level of fragmentation, but recently the number of cooperative experiences has increased. In 
addition, in literature there is a lack of empirical studies comparing the distribution of value 
added among players in different supply chain schemes. For these reasons, we decided to 
investigate the vegetable sector. 
With the purpose of answering the research questions, the remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows: in the next section the methodology used in the study is described in 
detail; in the third section the case study is presented; the fourth section focuses on the 
results of the empirical analysis; finally, in the last section we discuss the findings of the 





Input-output method and ISMEA value chain 
 
With the aim of answering the research questions, we implemented the ISMEA value chain 
method. This tool is based on Leontief input-output model (Leontief, 1941; Alvaro, 1999; 
Guarini and Tassinari, 1995; Miller and Blair 1985). The aim of ISMEA value chain is to share 
the household spending for a product among all the players who directly and indirectly 
contribute to the manufacturing process (ISMEA, 2014a; 2014b; 2009; 2008). This 
methodology relies on the ISMEA system of input-output tables of agrifood sector, for 2011, 
which consist of a focus of ISTAT input-output tables for Italian economy, which are updated 
to 20112 (ISMEA, 2005; 2004; 1998; 1997; ISTAT, 2006; Mantegazza and Pascarella, 2006). 
Given the complexity of the vegetable sector, in the study we focused on two varieties of the 
same product: the “Spadone” chicory and the corresponding Protected Geographical 
Indication (PGI) “Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo”. Both grow only in Veneto and their 
production process is very hard-working and expensive, so that they can be considered as 
“niche products”. 
The first step of the empirical analysis was to outline the flowchart of products chosen for 
the case study, collecting and attributing prices and quantities produced and sold to the 
different stages of the supply chain. 
The dataset was built by referring to ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto and Veneto Agricoltura 
data. Where data were missing, we integrated them with information from telephone and in-
depth interviews to members of POs, and individual farmers, to wholesalers and to other 
experts from Veneto.  
By using the matrix of direct and indirect requirements and that of the coefficients of primary 
inputs3, it is possible to share the value added to each industry (the remuneration of inputs) 
and to allocate the expenditure for the purchase of intermediate goods to supply industries. 
                                                          
2  ISTAT input-output tables for the Italian economy has 63 industries, whereof one referred to 
Agriculture, one to Fisheries, one to Food and beverages industry. ISMEA input-output tables focuses 
on these three industries, splitting into 27 agricultural and fisheries sectors, into 9 food and beverages 
sectors, and into 3 chemical sectors. 
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Direct requirement coefficients refer to the proportion of inputs directly required from 
industries by industries to produce 1 unit of output. On the other hand, indirect requirements 
coefficients depend on the chain of calculations of output requirements, and can be 
continued beyond the direct requirements of an industry.  
Indirect requirements can arise even when there is no direct dependence between sectors. 
For example, the red chicory sector may not directly require any input from the chemical 
industry, but it requires inputs from the plant nursery sector, which cannot be satisfied 
without inputs from the chemical industry. 
The basic equation of the model is: 
[1]                                                             ሺܫ െ ܣሻܺ ൌ ܦ 
where I is the unit matrix, A is the matrix of direct requirements, X is the vector of the total 
production and D the demand vector. 
If we know the demand D and the direct requirements, we can calculate the vector of 
production:  
[2]                                                               ܺ ൌ ሺܫ െ ܣሻିଵܦ ሺܫ െ ܣሻିଵ is the Leontief matrix, that is the matrix of direct and indirect coefficients. 
Giving the coefficients of primary inputs, we can calculate the value added in function of the 
production too: ሾ͵ሿ                                                  ௝ ൌ Ԃ௝ሺܫ െ ܣሻିଵܦ 
If we multiply the rows of the matrix of the primary inputs for the columns of Leontief 
matrix, we obtain the matrix of direct and indirect coefficients of primary inputs. 
This final equation allows to calculate value added in function of the final demand of the 
sectors. Therefore, the coefficients of this matrix indicate the value added increase for each 




During the first phase of the case study, through the analysis of product flows (in terms of 
prices and quantity), we identified three supply chain types: a very short chain (direct 
selling), a medium chain (large retailing channels), a long chain (traditional retail).  
Figure 1 illustrates the flowchart of Spadone chicory supply chain, while figure 2 those of 
Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo. 
Wholesale (both directly and indirectly) is the most important channel for both products, as 
resulted that wholesalers market half of the production collected by POs. Wholesalers are 
very heterogeneous: there are traders that operate both in and out Treviso market, others 
pick and pack the products. Usually wholesalers’ channels are characterized by many 
intermediate steps to get the product from farm to fork. This fragmentation creates 
inefficiencies in the system, as resulted from a survey conducted by the Italian Competition 
Authority (AGCM 2007). 
The amount of product managed by POs is still limited: it is about 32%, half of which is 
channeled to the final retailers through wholesalers. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
majority of Italian POs doesn’t feature a commercial structure, and work with wholesaler 
partners to market its products. This phenomenon represents an additional product passage, 
leading to an inefficiency of the chain.  
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Figure 1. Chartflow of Spadone chicory 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura  
 
Almost half of the production value of the whole chicories produced in Veneto goes through 
POs (Veneto Agricoltura, 2012a). This is due to the limited size of farms in Treviso, the lack 
of ability to associate among farmers and the relevance of wholesalers in the region. 
According to the Observatory on Trade of the Ministry of Economic Development, in 2013 
Veneto has the highest density of intermediaries (5.3 per 1,000 inhabitants). More in details, 
Veneto concentrates over 10% of Italian agricultural wholesalers/brokers (MISE, 2014). 
POs in the red chicory supply chain (certified or not) do not export: they sell the products to 
specialized wholesalers, who sell it abroad. Also this phenomenon represents a significant 
inefficiency for the sector. In 2011 only 500 tons of Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo were 
produced. They only represent 3% of the quantity, which potentially can be certified in 
municipalities covered by the regulations (Rossetto, 2014). 
The low impact of certification is due to the strict production regulations. Producers believe, 
in fact, that the process is long and costly, with high possibility that produce does not 
comply with the requirements in order to be certified. Consequently, the high non-
compliance risk encourages many entrepreneurs to produce and market conventional 
product. Farmers highlighted other complicated aspect for certification in the commercial 
channels. Indeed, certification will raise the cost of production and selling price, which 
doesn’t meet modern retailing policies, highly concerned with the quality/price ratio 
(Rossetto, 2014). The PGI label is compatible only with the channels, such as specialty 
stores and export, able to perform high pricing policies. Furthermore, the production of 
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Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo is only possible for very specialized and financially solid 
farms, oriented to innovation and investment (Veneto Agricoltura, 2012b). 
 
Figure 2. Chartflow of Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
Another important issue is the “uncertainty of certification”, as to say that producers depend 
on wholesaler book orders to establish the quota of certified products. Wholesalers decide if 
the products have to be labeled with the PGI mark or not, only on the basis of their buyers 





Figure 3 reports findings of the selected model. It shows the distribution of € 1 of 
consumer’s expenditure among stakeholders for both types of product (certified or not) and 
for all type of final distribution. 
First, the farmers’ value added share is higher in the case of chicory – whether certified or 
not - than in the case of the agricultural sector considered as a whole. In fact, in the second 
case the benefit of farmers is equal to € 0.22 (ISMEA, 2014a), while for red chicory farmers 
it acquires a value between € 0.26 - 0.80 in the case of the conventional product, instead 
between € 0.29 - 0.79 in the case of certified product. 
Second, there is no significant difference in the value added gained by the farmers between 
certified and conventional product. The quota of income gained by farmers is related to the 
type of final retailing channels and to the length of the supply chain (AGCM, 2007). As 
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expected, it is the highest when consumers buy the product by direct selling, medium when 
the product is purchased in large retail store, and the lowest when it is acquired in a 
traditional store. 
 
Figure 3. Results of ISMEA value chain on Spadone chicory and Radicchio Rosso di Treviso 
tardivo by type of final distribution. Results of ISMEA value chain on total agricultural sectors 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
 
Direct selling is the most profitable channel for the farmer, but it concerns 15% of the 
volumes of Spadone chicory and only 7% of the PGI product (see fig. 1 and 2). Indeed, the 
intervention of intermediaries between growers and retailers increases the product final cost. 
At the same time, it activates other sectors, and their activities and services aiming at 
marketing the product. 
In order to verify if there is an efficiency gain (that is an increase in farmers’ margins and a 
decrease in consumer prices, or an increase in additional services to the product), we 
analyzed ISMEA value chain results combined with final consumer prices. Results are shown 
in fig. 4 and 5. First, as already tested, direct selling is the most efficient channel for both 
products. Otherwise, considering the other channels, we can conclude that large retail is 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 52
ND




more efficient than traditional retail. Indeed, in both product chains, farmers’ income share is 
greater than in the traditional retail one; at the same time, when consumers purchase the 
product in a large retailing store, the price is lower than the one in the traditional stores. 
 
Figure 4. Results of ISMEA value chain on Spadone chicory by type of final distribution. 
Distribution of the consumer expenditure for 1 kg of product 
 
 Source: Own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
Figure 5. Results of ISMEA value chain on Radicchio rosso di Treviso tardivo by type of final 
distribution. Distribution of the consumer expenditure for 1 kg of product 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
 
Generally, the PGI products have higher prices compared to the conventional ones, because 
of their costly process of production implying additional costs, such as the certification 
compliance production costs (farmers) and the certification administrative and bureaucracy 
costs (POs and other sectors). This fact can support the finding that in the PGI chicory chain 
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there is a slight increase of the income share belonging to farmers, to POs and other sectors 
(except wholesalers) because of the certification administrative and bureaucracy costs. 
If on the one hand, in both product chains POs value added is higher in the case of large 
retailing purchasing than in the traditional retailing one, on the other hand for wholesalers it 
is the opposite. Finally, the added value addressed to traditional retailing is higher than that 
allocated to large retailing.  
These results suggested improving the analysis with a simulation, in order to answer the 
research question, namely, if the presence of POs in the supply chain is rewarding for 
growers in both cases, conventional and certified product.  
More closely, in the simulation we provided two extreme scenarios. In both cases, the 
quantity of products addressed to final consumption and to retailers is not considered.  
In the first scenario, we considered that the product is brokered only by wholesalers to 
retailers, while, in the second scenario, we suppose that the whole production is managed 
by POs. 
Figure 6 shows the results of simulation focusing on the products (certified and not certified) 
marketed on large retailing, while figure 7 illustrates findings in the case of traditional 
retailing. 
From the simulations, the farmers gain higher value added when POs are the only broker of 
the products (scenario 2), compared to the share acquired in the scenario 1.  
At the same time, these results suggest that when consumers purchase conventional 
products at the supermarket or at the traditional retail store, wholesalers and other sectors 
take over a share of the farmers and final retailers’ income. This is not the case of scenario 
2.  
Indeed, in scenario 2, the increase of farmers’ income share depends on the higher price 
paid to the producer by POs compared to the usual market price. This is due to the mutual 
goal of a cooperative venture (Cotterill, 1984; 1987). 
 
Figure 6. Results of simulations of scenarios on ISMEA value chain on Spadone chicory and 
Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo, when consumer buys the product at large retailing 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
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Figure 7. Results of simulations of scenarios on ISMEA value chain on Spadone chicory and 
Radicchio Rosso di Treviso tardivo, when consumer buys the product at traditional retailing 
 
Source: own elaborations on data from ISMEA, ISTAT, Regione Veneto – Veneto Agricoltura 
 
Focusing on the other sectors in the chain (other agricultural sectors, industry, services), 
their value added shares are slightly lower when a PO intermediates the product instead of a 
wholesaler, probably because of the capacity to "internalize" through POs some of the 
activities otherwise outsourced.  
These results suggest that, shifting from wholesalers to POs, an income share transfer from 
wholesalers and other services to retailers and farmers. It could means that, in the POs 
scenario, the extreme sides of the supply chain – farmers and retailers – tend to carry out 





This paper discusses if the presence of POs can improve fairness and efficiency in the 
distribution of the value added along the supply chain in the F&V sector, in particular if it 
could improve farmers’ position in the first stage of the supply chain. Indeed, on the basis of 
the results of the study, it is possible to point out some interesting features of the market 
structure and of the GIs system in the F&V sector. 
Firstly, the analysis confirms that farmers gain a wider value added by adopting direct 
marketing system, thus the development of this channel of distribution should be 
incentivized and promoted. However, as in Italy F&V production is very specialized and 
locally concentrated, for sure intermediate and final distribution (traditional, specialty, large 
retailing) will continue to represent the main outlet for these products, therefore it has to be 
investigated with the aim of revealing possible inefficiencies in it. 
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In particular, inefficiencies are generated because of the huge amount of intermediate 
passages of the product from farm to fork. Often wholesalers create additional stages of 
marketing intermediation, without adding a real value to the product. This system 
disadvantages both the producer, who gains less profit, and the final consumer, who spends 
more money. 
Sometimes Venetian POs create some inefficiencies. First of all, POs sell part of the 
members’ produce through wholesalers, who are members on their turn, since they don’t 
feature their own commercial structure. This leads to an additional passage to get to the 
final market, i.e. to inefficiency. Secondly, they do not export, but they sell chicories to 
commercial intermediaries who sell abroad. Such markets are becoming a very interesting 
option because the product covered by this study is particularly appreciated and requested 
by Northern European markets, particularly Germany and the Netherlands.  
Nevertheless, POs contribute to create much efficiency and fairness in value added 
distribution along the supply chain, as they guarantee higher profits to their members 
compared to what they would obtain by selling their products to wholesalers. 
These findings endorse the POs presence and importance in the supply chain organization, 
highlighting the necessity of strengthening their role through the activities of IBO in charge 
of improving the efficiency of the supply chain (producers, intermediates, retailers). The 
interaction among the different market players can be improved by implementing the wide 
range of tools that can facilitate both vertical and horizontal coordination of the production 
chain. This idea is also well explained in the consideranda of the EU Reg. n. 1308/2013: 
“interbranch organizations can play a central role in facilitating the dialogue among the 
different actors along the supply chain, and in promoting good practice and fair trade”. On 
the basis of this thesis suggesting the empowerment of POs, these results support also the 
innovative elements introduced by the latest fruit and vegetables sector CMO, which 
provides for financial funds addressed to Associations of Producers Organizations (APO), with 
the aim of strengthening their operative role in the process of coordination in F&V sector 
(supply concentration and higher level of efficiency in along the production chain).  
Indeed, organizations operating at a superior level can coordinate the activities of the 
different parts of the supply chain in a better way, as they operate in a wider territorial area, 
and they can control the inefficiencies in the intermediate stages.  
If on the one hand POs and IBO result to be fundamental institutions to be promoted, on the 
other hand, taking into account the importance of the intermediate phase in the Italian F&V 
sector, it is worth considering effective tools that can make more transparent the 
intermediation of these products through actions that involve directly the wholesalers. 
Another important evidence arises during the study is the low economic impact of the GIs on 
the distribution of the value added along the supply chain, without any evident advantage 
for the farmer. This result confirms the general weakness of GIs in the F&V sector, where 
the products are not so adaptable to standardization as other processed food. 
This is due to problems linked both to poor coordination of producers and the lack of 
recognition of the market for short knowledge of the brands, outclassed by the increased 
effectiveness of commercial brands. Second, in the case of Radicchio Rosso di Treviso 
tardivo there are other difficulties in retailing: the product has a very limited diffusion among 
consumers (only Veneto region and neighboring regions). Many actions would be necessary 
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to expanding and explore alternative marketing channels, by means of commercial 
promotion of the PGI label in agreement with large retailing. These ventures should also 
reduce the uncertainty of the certification at the discretion of the intermediaries, although 
this is a very ambitious goal. 
Third, a more radical reflection is requested about the real potential of this PGI label, in fact 
Spadone chicory has already a strong identity widely recognized by the local market. In 
general, this research suggests using GIs only when this can get some positive effects on 
affecting significantly farmers’ profitability. GIs should be a tool for enlarging the market to 
other regions and distribution channels, but achieving such an ambitious objective require a 
strong collective and coordinated action involving all the actors in the supply chain4. 
As evidenced by other studies, GIs are often weak and fragile because of the large number 
and diversity of whose aims and objectives of stakeholders which addresses (Galli, 2011; 
Galli et al., 2010). 
Actually EC Reg. 510/2006 shows several objectives of GIs, linked each other by a complex 
system of synergies and trade off: 
1. indicating to consumers the origin of the product associated with specific rules of 
production; 
2. increasing product differentiation on the market, by promoting a balance between supply 
and demand; 
3. improving the performance of farmers, for example in terms of market share and 
premium price compared to conventional products; 
4. improving the bargaining power of farmers of local products of high quality, whose 
economic size is often a limit that does not allow to do promotional activities able to make 
known the quality of the product; 
5. indirectly promoting local development of the place of origin, especially in rural areas, 
safeguarding its identity and the continuation of the traditions and cultural activities related 
to the product (Galli et al., 2010). 
The heterogeneity of the objectives just mentioned, the corresponding stakeholders and the 
different expectations on the results, make GIs extremely vulnerable. 
These empirical findings and their generalization must be carefully evaluated, taking into 
account that the analysis is based on a F&V supply chain case study, thus partly influenced 
by the peculiar structure of this supply chain.  
Nevertheless, this analysis can be useful for policy makers in consideration of the recent EU 
public consultation about the application of the waiver from the competition regime for olive 





AGCM - Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2007), Indagine sulla 
distribuzione agroalimentare, IC28, http://www.agcm.it/indagini-conoscitive-
                                                          
4 Of course these policies make sense only if consumers′ willingness to pay WTP for the GIs is proved and returns to 
certification are higher than the associated costs. 
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